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markedly more from the international pattern than the boom phase does. The bust is 
considerably deeper and the recovery comes earlier and is more rapid. 
 
We explain the highly volatile character of the Finnish and Swedish boom-bust episode by the 
design of economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s. The boom-bust cycle in Finland and 
Sweden 1984-1995 was driven by financial liberalization and a hard currency policy, causing 
large pro-cyclical swings in the real rate of interest transmitted via the financial sector into the 
real sector and then into the public finances. 
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The Boom-Bust Cycle in Finland and Sweden 1984-1995 in an International 
Perspective 
 
 
1. Introduction
1 
 
Finland and Sweden experienced an intense boom in the late 1980s, followed by a sharp 
contraction in the early 1990s and an exceptionally long recovery roughly until the turn 
of the century. The intensity of this boom-bust cycle is unique in the economic history of 
the two countries – but it is not unique in an international context. Actually, a pattern of 
boom-bust is common to many countries in recent decades and, in this respect, Finland 
and Sweden are no exception. What is exceptional is that two such advanced welfare 
states such as Finland and Sweden with a tradition of full employment and well-
developed social systems could end up in such a deep financial crisis with unprecedented 
decline in real output, dramatic rise in unemployment and exploding government deficits. 
The banking and currency crisis of the 1990s turned out to be one of the most severe ever 
to occur in the two Nordic countries – in some aspects the worst on record.
2  
 
For policy-makers, economists and the public the magnitude of the boom and bust of the 
1990s came as a surprise.
3 The common view was that “it couldn’t happen here”. After 
the crisis, however, a large volume of research has dealt with various aspects of the 
boom-bust cycle: its effects on the financial system, on the fiscal stance and on the real 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Claudio Borio at BIS for making data available to us. The construction 
of this data set is described in Appendix I in Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994). We are indebted 
to Claudio Borio, Michael D. Bordo, Thomas Hagberg, Timo Hirvonen, David Mayes, Heikki 
Oksanen and Sari Sontag for constructive comments, to Karel Havik for hard work with the 
charts and to Sophie Bland for editorial improvements. 
2 See Jonung and Hagberg (2005) for a comparison of the costs in terms of lost output, industrial 
production and employment of the six deepest crises in Finland and Sweden during the period 
1870-2000. They conclude that the crisis of the 1990s was Finland’s most severe, as measured by 
the loss in output, and in Sweden it was the longest crisis on record. The cumulative loss in 
employment was the biggest ever – much worse than during the Great Depression of the 1930s in 
both countries.  
3 This is clear from the memoirs by and interviews with policy-makers in Finland and Sweden. 
See the account in Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2006).    3
economy and the role of economic policies in inducing and alleviating the crisis.
4 As a 
rule this work has been focused either on the two countries’ individual experience or on 
their joint record; hardly any systematic comparisons between the Finnish and Swedish 
boom-bust pattern and the international experience have been forthcoming.
5 The purpose 
of this paper is to remedy this deficiency.  
 
The paper is organized in the following way. First, we describe the methodology on 
which our empirical work is based as developed by Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004). They 
devise a technique to separate boom-bust episodes from standard business cycle phases 
for a large number of countries. In this way they arrive at a dating of boom-bust episodes, 
which we adopt when calculating the average behavior of the variables that we study in a 
comparative perspective.  
 
Second, we present a brief account of the driving forces behind the boom-bust pattern in 
Finland and Sweden. Here we focus on the impact of financial deregulation combined 
with the defense of the fixed exchange rate policy in pushing the two countries first into a 
phase of overheating with rising inflation and loss of competitiveness, and subsequently 
into a deep financial crisis with falling output and rising unemployment. The twin crisis, 
the domestic banking crisis and the currency crisis for the Finnish markka  and the 
Swedish  krona, was eventually halted and resolved when the two currencies were 
allowed to float and the monetary stance could be relaxed. At the same time the strategy 
of the two central banks was changed, with inflation-targeting replacing the defense of 
the fixed exchange rate.
6 This post-mortem of the boom and bust in the two Nordic 
countries helps us to identify a number of key variables, which we examine more closely 
in our cross-country comparisons.  
 
                                                 
4 See for example studies by Bordes, Currie and Söderström (1993), Englund and Vihrälä (2003), 
Honkapohja and Koskela (1999), Jonung, Stymne and Söderström (1996), Mayes, Halme and 
Liuksila (2001) and Åkerholm (1995). 
5 An exception is Kokko and Suzuki (2003) who compare the Nordic crisis with the Japanese 
crisis.  
6 Eventually Finland adopted the euro in 1999 while Sweden maintained its national currency 
after the euro referendum in 2003.    4
Next, we examine the boom-bust pattern of seventeen key time series in Finland and 
Sweden compared to their international averages using our dating methodology. We 
focus on three areas: developments in the financial system, in the real sector and in public 
finances. We find clear differences between the Nordic countries and our international 
sample. The boom-bust cycle was stronger in Finland and Sweden as measured by almost 
all the time series; in particular we find that the downturn and the recovery was much 
more severe. 
 
We conclude that the Finnish and Swedish crisis of the early 1990s should be viewed as 
part of a full-fledged, textbook boom-bust cycle. This cycle was driven by financial 
liberalization and the hard currency policy, causing large swings in the real rate of 
interest transmitted via the financial sector to the real sector and then to the public 
finances. Strongly pro-cyclical monetary policies made the boom-bust pattern worse than 
elsewhere in the world.  
 
 
2. Methodology for identifying booms and busts 
 
Boom-bust cycles have attracted a growing interest by researchers in recent years, and 
there have been a number of theoretical and empirical studies on their causes and 
consequences. A major challenge is to identify empirically episodes of boom-bust, for 
which there is no commonly accepted method. See for example the work by Bordo and 
Jeanne (2002), one of the first attempts to measure boom-bust periods in a comparative 
setting. Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994), Borio and Lowe (2002), Detken and Smets 
(2004) and Helpling and Terrones (2004) apply different methods for constructing 
chronologies of booms and busts from various time series.
7 
 
Here we build our analysis on the results derived by Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004). They 
construct boom and bust phases in real aggregate asset prices by following a dating   5
method initially proposed by Harding and Pagan (2002), based on the so-called triangular 
methodology. This technique identifies the peaks and troughs of the asset price series 
(their turning points). Then Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) calculate the duration of the 
period from trough to peak (the upswing) and from peak to trough (the downturn) and the 
amplitude of the asset price changes over these periods. By multiplying duration and 
amplitude, they arrive at a ranking of asset price upswings and downturns, the largest 
quintile of which is referred to as boom-bust episodes. This enables them to separate 
booms and busts in asset prices from more normal asset price movements. Using this 
method, a boom does not necessarily need to be followed by a bust, and vice versa.  
 
In this way they arrive at a classification of booms and busts in real asset prices for 16 
industrialized countries for 1970-2002, including the seven major industrial countries 
(G7), Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
and Switzerland as shown in Table 1. Altogether 20 boom and 20 bust phases are 
identified for this period. The duration of boom-bust cycles in asset prices usually ranges 
from 5 to 7 years, quite a prolonged period compared with the normal business cycle.  
 
Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) find that nearly all countries included in their sample went 
through booms and busts in real asset prices in 1970-2002. Germany, Italy and Belgium 
are the only ones that did not face persistent and large asset price swings that qualify as a 
boom phase in this period, while the United States and Germany did not experience a 
bust. The booms are mainly concentrated in the second half of the 1980s (eight episodes) 
and in the 1990s (nine incidents), while the busts mostly took place in the early 1990s 
(eight or nine events) and to a lesser extent in the late 1970s/early 1980s (seven incidents 
altogether).  
 
They conclude that Finland and Sweden experienced a strong boom in real asset prices in 
1986-89 and a particularly severe bust in 1990-93. In both countries the boom phase and 
the bust phase were relatively short. Their dating is consistent with the recent literature 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 See also Chapter II in World Economic Outlook of April 2003 and Chapter IV of April 2004 for 
an analysis of credit booms in emerging markets, IMF (2003, 2004). The approach of these   6
on the Finnish and Swedish financial crises of the early 1990s, which arrives at roughly 
the same dating of the boom and the bust in asset prices.
8  
 
For the purpose of comparing boom-bust phases across industrialized countries with 
those of Finland and Sweden in the late 1980s and early 1990s, we adopt the dating of 
Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) and calculate the average behaviour for a number of 
macroeconomic variables deemed important to understand booms and busts. We examine 
a broader range of variables than they do. The computations are done in annual terms 
from t-5 to t+6, where t=0 is the observation for the peak year of the boom. Hence, t-5 to 
t=0 portrays representative developments during booms and t+1 to t+6 during busts. The 
calculations of the averages for industrialized countries exclude data for Finland and 
Sweden for the 1986-89 boom and the 1990-93 bust. 
 
We do similar computations for Finland and Sweden covering the 1986-89 boom and the 
1990-93 bust periods, where t=0 is set at 1989. This year is often considered the peak 
year of the asset boom in Finland and Sweden before the financial crises struck.
9 Next, 
we plot in the same chart three time series: one for Finland, one for Sweden and one for 
the international average during boom-bust episodes. In this way we are able to compare 
the development of the same variables across booms and busts and across our three 
observational units: Finland, Sweden and the international sample. Lastly, using these 
charts we are finally able to analyze differences and similarities between Finland, 
Sweden and the international average. The charts allow us to consider a number of issues 
such as to what extent the Finnish and Swedish pattern differs from the average of our 
sample of countries and from each other, and to what extent the policy response in the 
two countries differs. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
chapters is extended by Helpling and Terrones (2004). 
8 See Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2006).  
9 The peak was reached in 1989 or in 1990 depending on which measure of economic activity is 
used. Here we focus on asset price movements. As asset prices peaked in 1989, we select that 
year as the peak year.   7
3. The boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden 1984-1995
10 
 
The evolution of the economies of Finland and Sweden during the last decades of the 20
th 
century is identical in many respects. As the causes and consequences of the boom-bust 
cycle in the two economies were identical, there are strong reasons to describe them as 
economic twins, as do Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2006).  
 
Prior to 1985, extensive credit market regulations restricted the level of interest rates and 
the supply of credit in both countries. High inflation and high inflation expectations had 
been deeply rooted since the early 1970s, which combined with regulated nominal 
interest rates established low real rates for those companies and private individuals that 
were able to obtain loans through the financial sector. The tax system favoured 
borrowing, yet households and companies were severely restricted in their choice of 
loans. Consequently, large portfolio imbalances existed because of the prevailing system 
of nominal interest rates, inflation and tax rates. Knowledge about risk management and 
financial behaviour in unregulated freely functioning financial markets was lacking 
among in the private sector among households, companies and financial institutions.  
 
Both countries maintained fixed exchange rates for their currencies at this stage. The 
fixed rate had strong political backing in the mid-1980s after the several devaluations 
during OPEC I and OPEC II came to be regarded as failures. According to the general 
consensus among economists and policy-makers, the fixed rate should serve as a nominal 
anchor for the domestic economy and should thus be defended vigorously against any 
speculation. Future devaluations were ruled out as an unsuccessful strategy as the 
beneficial effects of the devaluations of the past had turned out to be short-lived, with 
rapid increases in wages and prices rapidly eliminating the gains in competitiveness thus 
obtained. 
 
                                                 
10 This section is built on several sources, notably Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2006) and Jonung, 
Stymne and Söderström (1996).   8
Around 1985 the domestic credit market was deregulated in both countries. Hardly any 
restrictive fiscal or monetary policy measures were taken in connection with or 
immediately following the financial deregulation. Nominal interest rates remained 
unchanged. Finland made a failed attempt in 1989 to dampen the boom by a revaluation 
of the markka. Fiscal policy remained relatively expansionary in both countries. 
 
Consequently, lending from banks and other financial institutions in national and foreign 
currencies, in particular for property purchases, increased rapidly. Debt as a percentage of 
GDP rose markedly. The rate of inflation and inflation expectations increased. Real after-
tax lending rates adjusted for inflation expectations were close to zero or negative for 
companies and households, which strengthened their demand for loans. Asset prices 
(prices on property, in particular commercial property, and shares) grew more rapidly 
than consumer prices. The rising asset prices formed the basis for rising collateral values 
and strong credit expansion. The financial system experienced a period of extreme 
expansion. 
 
The outcome was a strong boom in the Finnish and Swedish economies in 1988-89 with 
overfull employment, rising consumption, and falling savings ratios. Residential 
construction was booming. The current account worsened as export performance 
weakened. Signs that the markka and the krona were overvalued emerged. The national 
budgets of the two countries turned into surplus during the peak on the back of property- 
and capital-based taxes as well as revenues from booming consumption and high wage 
growth. Public consumption and public expenditures grew rapidly during the boom as 
well. The strong international expansion in the second half of the 1980s contributed to the 
overheating of the Finnish and Swedish economies. 
 
In 1990-91 the boom in the real economy was halted and turned into a bust by a 
combination of factors. Real interest rates rose internationally as a result of the German 
monetary policy reorientation due to the financing of the German reunion, putting strong 
upward pressure on Finnish and Swedish rates. The complete abolishment of capital 
controls in Sweden in 1989 initiated an outflow of private capital, reducing domestic   9
demand. The Swedish 1990-91 tax reform made borrowing less attractive and stimulated 
private savings, effectively raising real after-tax rates. In Finland stepwise limitations in 
the tax deductibility of mortgage rates in the early 1990s increased the after-tax cost of 
servicing debt. 
 
Monetary policy was rendered more restrictive by the pegging of the Finnish and 
Swedish currencies to the ecu in 1991. Previously the exchange rate had been linked to a 
basket of currencies. But Finnish and Swedish interest rates increased when attempts 
were made to defend the fixed exchange rate against recurring speculative attacks in 
1989-92. As the Finnish and Swedish currencies became overvalued due to rapid 
domestic inflation, the export sector started to encounter rising problems. For Finland the 
collapse of trade with the Soviet Union contributed to domestic problems.  
 
A rapid and less than fully expected decline in the rate of consumer price inflation and 
inflation expectations in 1990-92 contributed to a sharp rise in real interest rates. Asset 
price deflation surfaced when the value of real assets was reduced by rapidly rising real 
interest rates. Balance sheets turned fragile when asset values, primarily property prices, 
fell below collateral values. Shareholders’ equity was reduced. The number of 
bankruptcies increased extremely quickly. Asset price deflation showed a cumulative 
tendency. The sell-out of property forced down property prices which, in turn, triggered 
new sales. 
 
Capital stocks became over-stretched when real rates of interest increased rapidly and 
remained high. As the balance sheets of households and firms were eroded, large 
negative wealth effects were set in motion. The level of consumption declined. The 
savings ratio of households increased rapidly. Investments plummeted, in particular 
within the construction sector. Unemployment soared and employment decreased 
drastically. Tax revenues fell and public expenditures rose. The government budget 
deficit increased dramatically.  
   10
A severe financial crisis occurred when the volume of non-performing loans increased 
rapidly. In 1992 the financial system of both countries was rocked to its foundations 
when the markka and the krona were exposed to major speculative attacks. An 
international currency crisis erupted in September 1992. The Finnish markka was set 
floating in September 1992. A floating exchange rate was introduced in Sweden two 
months later, in November 1992.  
 
The floating of the domestic currencies eventually checked the downturn of the Finnish 
and Swedish economy. An upturn commenced in the following year and lasted for 
several years, but unemployment remained high. It did not start to decline until the mid-
1990s and continued to fall thereafter. Wages and prices were kept fairly stable due to 
high unemployment. The recovery was driven by the strong upturn in exports. Export 
shares rose significantly in both countries. Inflation targets were introduced. Fiscal policy 
was directed towards lowering the budget deficit. The rate of inflation was kept at a low 
level, around two percent per annum throughout the period 1995-2000. The recovery 
after the boom-bust cycle was lengthy – it lasted until the downturn in worldwide 
economic activity around 2001. Still, Finnish and Swedish growth rates in the early 
2000s stayed above the EU average. 
 
 
4. The international perspective 
 
The above account of the Finnish and Swedish boom-bust cycle demonstrates that 
financial developments – credit growth, asset prices and real after-tax lending rates – 
were principal factors driving the boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden. The 
deregulation of the financial markets should properly be seen as the start of the cycle – 
the impulse that initiated the whole process. This impulse, emanating from the financial 
sector, impacted on the rest of the economy and on public finances. Of course, there was 
also feedback from the real economy and public finances into the financial sector as well. 
For this reason we will start our empirical analysis by studying the behaviour of some   11
financial variables in a comparative perspective. We will then move on to the real 
economy and to public finances.
11  
 
4.1 Financial and price developments 
 
The international evidence demonstrates that several recent asset price cycles have started 
with a positive shock to the financial environment in the form of financial liberalization 
combined with favorable interest rates. Liberalization has triggered both a demand and a 
supply shock in credit as households and companies find it easier to borrow and banks 
and other financial institutions easier to lend. These developments have impacted 
significantly on domestic credit developments, causing a rise in domestic credit growth 
and contributing to the emergence of and fueling of a boom. After the boom runs its 
course, high debt and valuation losses of assets undermine private and financial sector net 
worth, resulting in a fall in collateral values and tightening of credit standards which in 
turn make it more difficult to lend and borrow.
12 Thus we start by examining the behavior 
of the volume of credit over the asset price cycle. 
 
Domestic credit  
Chart 1, displaying the growth rate of domestic credit in Finland and Sweden and the 
international average, demonstrates first of all that credit growth was extremely volatile 
in the Nordic countries. During the boom 1984-89, growth was higher than the 
international average. Credit growth in Finland and Sweden peaked at about 30 % and 20 
% annual growth respectively in the boom. During the subsequent bust, the decline in 
growth was much stronger in the Nordic countries. Growth became negative for several 
years while it remained positive internationally.  
 
                                                 
11 Appendix B displays the boom-bust pattern of six additional aggregates. 
12 See the financial accelerator literature, e.g., Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Drees and 
Pazarbasioglu (1998) give an excellent account of the Finnish and Swedish boom-bust cycle from 
this perspective. See also Englund and Vihriälä (2003). The role of credit in the boom-bust cycle 
in Nordic countries is stressed by among others Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994).    12
This large difference in credit developments between the two Nordic countries and the 
international average, especially in the downturn – which we will also find for other 
economic variables in the following – is due to the fact that Finland and Sweden 
experienced a full-fledged and very rapid twin crisis – a deep banking crisis and a 
currency crisis at the same time – which severely disrupted financial intermediation. This 
was not the case for most of the other episodes in our sample.  
 
Asset prices 
The international evidence from asset price cycles suggests that rapid domestic credit 
growth during the boom phase is primarily channeled through asset markets, in particular 
the market for real estate. This is consistent with what one would conjecture from the fact 
that real estate demand in particular is strongly correlated with credit availability while 
supply only reacts with a lag. Chart 2 shows that inflation-adjusted real estate price 
increases averaged almost 10 % annually over the boom years. This gain was partly 
reversed in the bust when price declines averaged about 5 %. Given the average length of 
upswings and downturns (about 5 years), this translates into average real increases of 
almost 50 %, most of which was reversed during the downswing.  
 
Looking at Finland and Sweden, the volatile picture of credit dynamics of Chart 1 is 
clearly mirrored in the real estate market in Chart 2. In Finland in particular, real estate 
price increases were dramatic, reaching up to 30 % in 1988, the year before the peak. The 
subsequent downturn was also steeper in the Nordic countries than elsewhere with a 
maximum year-on-year decline of 20 % for Finland.
13 In both countries, the full capital 
gain in house prices was eliminated during the bust. Chart 2 also demonstrates that after 
Finland and Sweden adopted a floating exchange rate, the fall in commercial and 
residential property prices was halted.  
 
                                                 
13 Prices of commercial property were more volatile than those of residential property. Price 
movements were also more volatile in cities than in rural areas.   13
Consumer prices 
Inflation, measured as the annual change in consumer prices, usually peaks after the top 
of the boom, judging from Chart 3. Here, it is important to distinguish the timing of 
boom-bust episodes as the busts of the late 1970s took place in a more inflationary 
environment than those of the early 1990s, and those of the late 1980s in a more 
inflationary environment than those of the late 1990s. Chart 3 presents the data for the 
average inflation rate for industrialized countries during different periods of booms and 
busts and compares them with Finland and Sweden.  
 
It is striking how much inflation has come down over the past 20 years and that the 
recovery and the boom of the late 1990s did not show any pickup in inflation; rather, 
inflation continued on a downward trend in the 1990s. Even in the boom of the late 
1980s, inflationary pressures remained relatively contained. However, at the end of the 
boom in the late 1980s, inflationary pressures in Finland and Sweden rose well above the 
average. In Finland inflation remained subdued while it rose sharply in Sweden during 
the bust, probably making the adjustment to the bust easier for the private sector than 
otherwise.  
 
Private sector indebtedness 
Strong credit growth that finances a real estate boom is prone to lead to growing 
indebtedness in the private sector. In the downturn, we expect that declining asset prices 
and wealth induce corporations and households to try to restore their balance sheets and 
to reduce their indebtedness. As data on private sector indebtedness is limited to a few 
OECD countries and is often only available from the mid-1990s, we can only look at a 
few individual countries and compare their experience with Finland and Sweden. 
 
The data for the two Nordic countries in Chart 4 and 5 reveal that both household and 
corporate debt increased rapidly in the late 1980s and, in the case of Finland, well into the 
downturn of the early 1990s. The Nordic countries’ corporate and household debt ratios 
of 30 % and 50 % of GDP in the boom do not look dramatic, compared with the figures 
in other countries. Australia, the Netherlands and Japan experienced corporate debt of   14
over 100 % of GDP and in a number of countries household debt was 60 % of GDP or 
higher. However, the increase in the debt ratio in the Nordic countries was higher than in 
most countries for which data is available. This was partly owing to the sharp 
depreciation of the Finnish markka and the Swedish krona, which resulted in a significant 
rise in the real value of the foreign-currency-denominated debt that many households and 
companies had contracted during the boom years.  
As regards balance-sheet repair efforts in the downturn, Finland and Sweden also stand 
out amongst industrialized countries that experienced boom-bust episodes. In these two 
countries household and corporate indebtedness did indeed return to pre-boom levels. 
This is not the case in most other episodes where balance sheet repair is more limited so 
that private debt ratios end up higher after the downturn than before the boom.  
 
Real interest rates 
Many observers of the Finnish and Swedish record have regarded the crisis as a result of 
a very sharp rise in real rates of interest – adjusted for inflation, actual or expected, and 
taxes – at the end of the 1980s.
14 They argue that the growth in credit was not only 
boosted by financial liberalization but also by a real after-tax interest rate environment 
that was extremely favorable to debt accumulation and especially debt for financing 
housing and construction investment. This comes out clearly in Chart 6. Real after-tax 
interest rates were negative or close to zero during the boom in both the Nordic countries 
and rose sharply – in particular in Sweden – during the bust phase. 
 
Unfortunately, data on real after-tax rates is not available for most countries in our 
sample. However, when looking at the international pattern of real interest rates (not 
adjusted for taxation), the dynamics of the monetary policy environment in Finland and 
Sweden is not very surprising (and is consistent with growth and output developments, as 
we will see later). Real interest rates tend to be somewhat higher internationally during 
the boom than during the bust. Nevertheless, there is also no interest rate tightening to 
speak of as the boom proceeds (Chart 6). The real rate falls during the international bust 
phase. 
                                                 
14 See for example Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2006).   15
 
This picture is markedly different from the experience of Finland and Sweden. Chart 6, 
displaying the real after-tax lending rate environment in the two Nordic countries, reveals 
that real after-tax rates were declining after the deregulation until the end of the boom in 
Finland and were negative in Sweden during the full boom phase. These very low after-
tax interest rates fuelled the growth of credit in the boom years in the 1980s. Then real 
after-tax rates increased sharply in a few years, surpassing the international level, 
contributing to the bust and the downturn with its credit slump. In other words, Finland 
and Sweden featured a highly pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policy environment.  
 
As pointed out in the previous section, the pro-cyclical monetary policies in Finland and 
Sweden had their origin in a number of factors. Both countries pursued nominal 
exchange-rate targeting policies, the hard currency strategy. With the easy credit policies 
of the late 1980s, interest rates could be kept very low. As inflation picked up, as the 
markka and the krona became the subject of speculative attacks, forcing the Bank of 
Finland and the Bank of Sweden to raise domestic rates to high levels, and as the 
international financial environment became less favorable (notably in the context of 
German unification and the ERM-crisis), real interest rates increased significantly. On 
top of that, changes in the Finnish and Swedish tax regimes at the height of the boom 
reduced incentives towards accumulating debt and had a strongly pro-cyclical effect on 
real after-tax rates. 
 
Exchange rates 
For open economies, the exchange rate is the central asset price, and thus a major 
determinant of macroeconomic performance. For the average of boom-bust episodes, the 
real effective exchange rate appreciates in the upswing. The resulting deterioration of 
external competitiveness is typically corrected in the downturn when the real effective 
exchange rate depreciates (Chart 7). 
 
Again the pattern is similar, though more extreme, for the two Nordic countries during 
the bust phase. As mentioned above, during the boom, the exchange-rate targeting   16
combined with easy credit resulted in a stable nominal exchange rate. In an environment 
of rising unit labor costs (discussed below), this translated into an appreciating real 
effective exchange rate. This development was reversed fully when both countries floated 
their exchange rates in 1992, roughly at the end of the second year of the bust. While the 
depreciation of the domestic currency initially exacerbated the net wealth position of 
holders of foreign debt, it also facilitated the rapid rebound through a readjustment in 
relative prices and competitiveness in the tradable sector. The exchange rate behavior of 
the markka and the krona is thus crucial for the understanding of the boom-bust cycle 
and, in particular, for the quick emergence of Finland and Sweden from the bust phase. 
The recovery was driven by the sharp rise in exports (see below). 
 
The net foreign asset position (the current account) 
Another way of assessing and comparing the effects of booms and busts on the balance-
sheet position of an economy is to examine the net foreign asset position across countries. 
However, in the absence of such comprehensive data, we look at the annual flows as 
reflected in the current account position of the balance of payments of countries. Chart 8 
shows the deterioration of the current account position for the average of boom-bust 
episodes and the subsequent correction of the imbalances in the bust. The average current 
account position turns from a small surplus to a deficit of almost 3 % of GDP at the end 
of the boom. By the end of the downturn, the imbalance was eliminated. 
 
This pattern is similar for Finland and Sweden except for the very final years of the 
observation period. Initially, the current account position deteriorated by 5 % of GDP in 
Finland and by 3 % in Sweden. This changed little until the depreciation of the domestic 
currency in 1992. By the fourth year of the bust a dramatic improvement had been 
recorded and the current account has remained in strong surplus ever since.  
 
Our stylized facts on financial and price developments during boom-bust episodes across 
industrialized countries demonstrate a common pattern of strong credit growth, asset 
price growth and deteriorating underlying private balance sheets in the boom. This 
picture is reversed in the subsequent bust. However, the pattern is much more   17
pronounced in the Finnish and Swedish cases where the bust in particular is deeper but 
also more short-lived compared to the international average. We conclude that the 
volatile pattern in Finland and Sweden is associated with very sharp changes in real 
interest rates and real exchange rates, much sharper and more dramatic than the average 
for industrialized countries. 
 
4.2. Real developments 
 
The pattern of changes in the current account position in Chart 8 is a constructive way to 
link the assessment of the financial position of countries over boom-bust episodes with 
that of the real economy to which we now turn.  
 
Real growth  
Real economic growth deviations from trend in boom-bust episodes are typically much 
more persistent than in normal business cycles. The period of above-average growth in 
the boom and below-average growth in the bust normally ranges from 5 to 7 years but it 
can be over 10 years long. Growth averages about 4 % for all boom episodes (Chart 9). In 
the bust, growth initially falls steeply and averages around 1 %. This finding of 
persistence is consistent with the view that rising asset prices and easy money stimulate 
demand in the boom before a correction in asset prices undermines individuals’ net worth 
and forces an extended period of subdued demand when balance sheets are adjusted. In 
the boom, savings tend to fall while consumption and investment rise. This boosts growth 
and also fuels the (above-mentioned) deterioration in the current account. In the bust the 
opposite happens as the private sector raises its savings, reduces its spending and, 
thereby, improves not only its wealth position but also the whole country’s external 
accounts. 
 
As regards growth in Finland and Sweden, the pattern is similar to other international 
episodes. However, due to lower trend growth, the growth curve, especially in Sweden, is 
shifted slightly downward. Nevertheless, the negative growth experienced by the two 
countries in the downturn is staggering. It is closely linked to the disruptions during their   18
financial crisis, as discussed above. This negative development was exacerbated in the 
short run by the tightening of fiscal policies via tax increases and spending cuts, made to 
restore the confidence of foreign investors in domestic economic policies and currencies 
in both countries.
15 
Output gaps 
Looking at output gaps in Chart 10, the extreme character of the Finnish and Swedish 
bust is revealed. As expected, Chart 10 shows a declining output gap for all countries in 
the boom and a rise in output gaps in the downturn. However, output gap developments 
were more volatile in the two Nordic countries. A positive gap of about 4 % was 
followed by a staggering output loss and negative output gap, measured at 6-8 %. Chart 
10 also demonstrates the rapid rebound from the fourth year after the asset price peak. 
This recovery coincides with the crisis resolution and the exchange rate depreciation. 
 
Consumption and investment 
The experience of boom-bust cycles reveals that they are typically accompanied by 
extreme private investment cycles and somewhat less pronounced private consumption 
cycles. Real private consumption growth was about 4 % for all countries and about 5 % 
in Finland and Sweden over the boom (Chart 11). Annual investment growth was about 
twice as high and peaked at 15 % in the Nordic countries just before the crash (Chart 12). 
The downturn featured a strong slowdown in consumption and a slightly negative 
investment growth rate for the average of all episodes. By contrast, the investment figures 
were distinctly negative for Finland and Sweden. In fact, the cumulative decline in 
investment over the bust was about one quarter in Sweden and a staggering 50 % in 
Finland. 
 
Exports  
The previous findings on boom-bust episodes are consistent with developments in 
exports. As the tradable goods sector lost competitiveness, export growth remained 
constant or slowed down in Finland and Sweden as well as in the international context 
                                                 
15 The collapse of the trade between Finland and the former Soviet Union made the recession 
deeper in Finland. The role of the Soviet trade is discussed by Kiander and Vartia (1998).   19
(Chart 13). The slowdown continued well into the bust and was only reversed when the 
depreciation restored competitiveness. The rebound in the Nordic countries was much 
sharper than the average of the other episodes and contributed significantly to the 
rebound of the real economy as a whole.  
 
Import developments are also consistent with this picture: rapid import growth in the 
boom was followed by a period of zero or even highly negative import growth, reflecting 
the reversing fortunes of domestic import competing industries in the boom-bust 
countries. This only reversed with a lag when the export boom was already well under 
way and thus created new import demand from this sector and the recovering economy.  
 
Employment  
The relatively subdued employment growth in Finland and Sweden in the boom and the 
stark fall in employment in the bust (Chart 14) stand out against the much more stable 
and balanced picture for the international average. The main reason for the modest 
employment growth during the boom in the Nordic countries is the fact that they were 
already operating at full employment when the boom started – in contrast to higher rates 
of unemployment in the industrialized countries in our sample. Thus the boom could not 
create much of an increase in employment – though it fell very sharply during the bust 
phase. 
 
The sharp fall in Nordic employment reflects a marked restructuring of the Finnish and 
Swedish labor market due to the financial crisis, in particular due to the collapse of the 
construction sector and the fact that the public sector shed labor as well.
16 In a historical 
perspective, the crisis of the 1990s made a stronger mark on employment than any other 
previous crisis.
17 Employment has still not returned to its pre-crisis level ten years after 
the bust. Similarly, unemployment rates have remained high during the recovery phase.
18 
 
 
                                                 
16 See Fregert and Pehkonon (2003). 
17 See Jonung and Hagberg (2005).   20
Real labor costs 
Real labor costs increase strongly during booms. Again this is consistent with the finding 
of booming consumption and housing investment and falling competitiveness (via rising 
labor costs and an appreciating real effective exchange rate). One way to measure this 
phenomenon is to look at the differential between real wages (compensation per 
employee) and productivity gains (Chart 15). For the average of all episodes, this figure 
is slightly positive, suggesting a small but persistent tendency to squeeze profits and to 
lose competitiveness. This process is reversed early in the bust, when productivity tends 
to rise faster than real wages. 
 
For Finland and Sweden, we again observe a similar but more pronounced pattern. In the 
boom, real compensation rose much faster than productivity and, because of the fixed 
exchange regime, this led to a marked loss of profitability and competitiveness for the 
tradable sector. In the bust, real productivity-adjusted wages fell strongly, as wage 
restraint through rising unemployment and depreciation both took effect. This helped 
restore the profitability of the corporate sector and thus contributed to the strong 
turnaround.  
 
This section on real economic developments demonstrates that growth, output gaps, 
consumption, investments, exports and employment developed favorably in the boom and 
negatively in the bust while real unit labor costs followed the reverse pattern. The main 
difference between boom-bust episodes and “normal” business cycles is, however, their 
persistence and magnitude. Finland and Sweden follow broadly the same pattern as that 
of other boom-bust episodes across industrialized countries. However, again both Nordic 
countries experienced more extreme fluctuations in these variables and the downturn 
appears to have been deeper and more short-lived. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 Chart B2 in Appendix B displays the rate of unemployment.    21
4.3. Public finance developments 
 
The behavior of fiscal aggregates illustrates the role of government in destabilizing as 
well as stabilizing the economy over boom-bust cycles. It reveals the role it has played in 
the underlying balance sheet cycle and thus how fiscal policy has impacted on aggregate 
demand through wealth effects. Changes in public debt reflect the design of discretionary 
fiscal measures and the workings of automatic stabilizers. 
 
Fiscal balances 
Unsurprisingly, fiscal balances tend to improve so much over extended boom periods that 
they are in surplus by the end of the boom (Chart 16). Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) 
argue that this is mainly the result of strong revenue growth from tax bases that directly 
benefit from rapid asset price increases, like property taxes and taxable capital gains, and 
indirectly, through wealth effects on demand. This budgetary improvement masks the 
continued relatively strong expenditure growth experienced in many industrialized 
countries over boom episodes. In the downturn, revenue windfalls reverse while spending 
obligations through the workings of automatic stabilizers such as unemployment benefits 
increase faster so that fiscal balances go quickly and deeply into the red. 
 
This pattern was experienced in an extreme manifestation by Finland and Sweden in the 
second half of the 1980s. Given an asset-price-sensitive tax system, revenue windfalls 
increased as shown by Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2004). Likewise, revenues from 
value added and wage-related taxes and social contributions rose sharply during the boom 
in consumption and the strong growth in wages, resulting in budget surpluses. These 
surpluses then turned into large deficits of 8-12 % of GDP within only a few years.  
 
This pattern illustrates the sensitivity of fiscal balances to a major negative shock such as 
a financial crisis. It also reflects the fact that the financial crisis and bank failures spurred 
drastic government action. Corporate/bank bailouts together with increased welfare 
spending represented a partial socialization of the losses incurred by the private sector 
during the boom-bust cycle. Without these measures supporting the balance sheets of   22
households and firms, the depression would have become even more severe. The policy 
of large budget deficits constitutes a clear case of tax smoothing during an exceptional 
emergency such as the financial crisis. 
 
Public debt 
Public debt developments are consistent with and confirm the picture of the involvement 
of the public sector in the boom-bust cycles in Finland and Sweden via taxes and 
expenditure. This pattern is visible in the strong increase of public debt during bust 
episodes, much larger than the decline in public debt in the preceding boom. For all 
episodes, debt declines in the boom by an average of 10 % of GDP before rising in the 
bust by about 25 % of GDP (Chart 17). In Finland the debt increase was almost 50 % of 
GDP and in Sweden it was almost 35 % of GDP. In the case of Finland, a significant part 
of the rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio was related to the marked fall in nominal GDP and 
the depreciation of the Finnish markka. 
 
Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) also find that the maintenance of relatively strong 
expenditure growth in the boom and the additional pressures in the bust result in 
significant increases in the size of government – a ratchet effect. Tax increases feature 
prominently in the downturn to compensate for the reversal of revenue windfalls 
experienced in the boom and to contain fiscal imbalances.   
 
Moreover, government policies have at times exacerbated boom-bust cycles through pro-
cyclical discretionary fiscal measures. In Sweden the budget surplus created by the boom 
was taken as an excuse for reducing taxes. The tax reform in Sweden that reduced debt-
friendly tax incentives at the height of the boom contributed to subsequent balance-sheet 
problems and thus to the severity of the downturn. As many have commented in Sweden, 
the tax reform should have been instituted at the beginning of the boom – not at the end 
of it.  
 
To sum up, we find an asymmetric participation of government in the “profits and losses” 
of boom-bust episodes – due to the workings of automatic stabilizers and the direct   23
financial support given to the financial system during the bust phase. In short, 
governments felt obliged to step in to socialize wealth losses made during the bust while 
not preventing the boom from developing by making fiscal and monetary policies 
contractionary. This was the case in Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s. The need to 
recapitalize the banking system was so large that the central bank did not and could not 
serve as a lender of last resort, as the solidity of the banking system was undermined. 
Instead, fiscal policy was used to support the financial system during the crisis.
19 
 
 
5. Summary 
 
We have compared the boom-bust experience in Finland and Sweden during the last half 
of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s with the average boom-bust pattern calculated for 
a sample of industrialized countries in the period 1970-2002. Our examination brings out 
two clear conclusions.  
 
First, the Finnish-Swedish experience is much more volatile than the average. In short, 
the boom as well as the bust is more intense in the two Nordic countries. This holds for 
practically every time series that we have examined: growth of credit, asset price 
inflation, real interest rates, real effective exchange rates, real growth, output gaps, 
consumption, investment, exports, employment, productivity, government budget deficits 
and government debt.  
 
Second, the bust and the recovery in the two Nordic countries diverge far more from the 
international pattern than the boom phase does. The bust is much deeper, and the 
                                                 
19 Here we have compared the pattern in Finland and Sweden with the international pattern of 
boom-busts for industrial countries using the methodology of Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004). A 
comparison of the Nordic pattern with that of a sample of 28 emerging countries demonstrates 
that the boom-bust episode in the two Nordic countries has many similarities with those of 
emerging markets. See Chapter IV in World Economic Outlook, April, 2004 (IMF 2004). The 
similarity between the Nordic lending boom and the lending booms preceding the Asian crisis are 
striking. See Collyns and Senhadji (2003) and Kokko and Suzuki (2003). 
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recovery comes earlier and is more rapid than in the countries of our international 
sample.  
 
How should we explain this highly volatile character of the Finnish and Swedish boom-
bust episode? The prime determinant must be identified as the design of monetary and 
fiscal as well as regulatory policies in the 1980s and 1990s. In the mid-1980s, the Finnish 
and Swedish financial systems were deregulated, allowing for an extremely rapid 
increase in the supply of credit. During the long period of financial regulation, real rates 
of interest had been kept low or often negative by a combination of direct controls of 
nominal interest rates, high inflation and a progressive tax system allowing for deduction 
of interest payments on loans. Once the restrictions on commercial bank lending were 
abolished as part of the financial deregulation, household and firms were able to rapidly 
build up their debt at extremely low real rates. Actually, the real rate was still negative 
during several years of the boom phase. The monetary and fiscal authorities initially took 
no steps to raise the real rate when the process of credit expansion set in. Both monetary 
and fiscal policies were procyclical during the boom.  
 
Eventually, the low or negative rates were replaced by high and rising rates at the end of 
the 1980s, which contributed to and reinforced other developments turning the boom into 
a bust. When the bust came, monetary and fiscal policies actually enforced the downturn 
as well. Several factors contributed to this highly pro-cyclical policy, most prominently 
the defense of the fixed exchange rate. For a short time in September 1992, the overnight 
rate of the Swedish Riksbank was set at 500 per cent. The cost of borrowing was 
increased by changes in the tax system in both countries.  
 
Finland and Sweden were hit simultaneously by a twin crisis; a banking crisis and a 
currency crisis. Their financial vulnerability was increased by a significant foreign 
currency-denominated debt. The impact of the contractionary forces is apparent from the 
very sharp and sudden bust. Monetary policies were, on balance, slightly countercyclical   25
in the international experience, hence probably also explaining the more moderate boom-
bust patterns.
20 
 
Once the two countries abandoned the defense of the fixed exchange rate and allowed 
floating rates in the fall of 1992, the economy’s downward slide was halted. The floating 
of the currency caused a sharp depreciation of the markka and the krona, which soon 
revived the export sector. The floating also allowed the central banks to lower nominal 
interest rates. Thus the boom-bust pattern in Finland and Sweden 1985-1995 was strongly 
driven by a financial liberalization and the design of monetary policy which caused very 
sharp swings in the real rate of interest which were transmitted via the financial sector to 
the real sector, first causing a strong boom and subsequently a sharp bust. Thanks to their 
dependence on international trade, the Nordic countries were able to stage a rapid 
recovery by means of the sharp depreciation of the currencies. The export share of both 
countries has increased significantly after the crisis. 
 
To sum up, Finland and Sweden displayed a very prominent boom-bust pattern – more 
prominent than in the other industrialized countries in our sample. The development of 
the Finnish and Swedish economy should properly be regarded – and thus studied – as a 
highly representative example of a full-fledged boom-bust cycle. The experience shows 
that “nobody is safe” from booms, busts and crisis. The study might, therefore, hold 
valuable lessons for other industrialized countries, emerging markets and transition 
economies.  
                                                 
20 Following the boom-bust of the early 1990s, financial stability issues emerged high on the 
agenda of policy-makers in Finland and Sweden. The issues involved are considered i. a. by 
Borio (2005).   26
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Appendix A. Data sources and definitions 
 
Domestic credit 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
 
Real estate prices 
Nominal prices of existing and new dwellings deflated with consumer price index. 
Source: BIS. 
 
Inflation 
Consumer price index. 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
 
Household debt 
Source: Riksbank and Suomen Pankki. 
 
Corporate debt 
Source: Riksbank and Suomen Pankki. 
 
Real long term interest rate 
Nominal long term interest rate – inflation rate (CPI) for other industrialised countries except for 
Finland and Sweden in which case the real after-tax rate is calculated for five year rate of interest 
for Finland and the ten year rate for Sweden.  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, IMF World Economic Outlook and Global Financial 
databases for other industrialised countries. For Finland and Sweden data are taken from Englund 
and Vihriälä (2003). 
 
Real effective exchange rate 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
 
Current account balance 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
 
Real GDP  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Output gap 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Real private consumption  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Real total investment  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Real exports of goods and services 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Total employment 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
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Productivity adjusted real labour costs 
The productivity adjusted real labour costs are defined as the difference between real 
compensation per employee growth and average productivity. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Government budget balance 
General government net borrowing/net lending as a percentage of GDP. Data have been corrected 
for one-off UMTS receipts.  
Source: European Commission Ameco, OECD Economic Outlook and IMF World Economic 
Outlook databases. 
 
Government debt 
General government gross debt as a percentage of GDP.  
Source: European Commission Ameco, OECD Economic Outlook and IMF World Economic 
Outlook databases. 
 
Data for Appendix B. 
 
Stock prices 
Nominal stock prices deflated with consumer price index. 
Source: BIS. 
 
Unemployment rate 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Average productivity 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Unit labour costs 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Nominal government revenue 
Source: European Commission Ameco, OECD Economic Outlook and IMF World Economic 
Outlook databases. 
 
Nominal government primary expenditure 
Source: European Commission Ameco, OECD Economic Outlook and IMF World Economic 
Outlook databases. 
 
 
 
   31
Table 1. Size distribution of identified boom-bust phases in real aggregate asset prices for 
industrialized countries, 1970-2002. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Boom  Phases        Bust  Phases 
Country     Years   Cumulative    Country    Years     Cumulative 
price change
1)      price  change 
1) 
Japan     1979-1990  358.0   Japan     1991-2002    -364.1 
Sweden    1994-2000   329.6     Sweden    1977-1985   -185.1 
Finland    1994-2000   293.1     Ireland     1979-1985   -173.3 
Ireland     1994-2001   289.1     Italy     1991-1997   -173.1 
Spain     1985-1990   249.4     Netherlands   1979-1983   -163.0 
Netherlands  1993-2000   237.2     Finland    1974-1979   -155.1 
United States   1995-2000   157.8     Finland    1990-1993   -135.4 
United Kingdom  1983-1989  152.1     Spain     1991-1995   -124.6 
Switzerland   1983-1989   110.9     Belgium   1980-1985   -115.2 
Finland    1986-1989     92.2     Denmark   1977-1982   -113.5 
Denmark   1996-2000     90.6     Australia   1973-1978   -113.4 
United Kingdom  1995-2000     90.4     Spain     1979-1982   -111.3 
Australia   1996-2002     89.2     France     1991-1996   -108.6 
Sweden    1986-1989     88.1     Sweden    1990-1993   -108.0 
Australia   1984-1989     87.7     United Kingdom  1974-1977   -106.3 
Denmark   1983-1986     85.9     Switzerland   1990-1996   -104.0 
Finland    1980-1984     84.9     Japan     1974-1978     -88.1 
Spain     1996-2000     84.0     United Kingdom  1990-1994     -86.1 
France     1986-1990     74.6     Italy     1981-1985     -80.7 
Canada    1985-1989     74.3     Canada    1990-1995     -80.2 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Source: Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004).  
Comments: 1) Based on triangular approximation. 
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Chart 1. Domestic credit growth in boom-bust episodes, annual change in percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
 
Chart 2. Real estate prices in boom-bust episodes, annual change in percent. 
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Data: See appendix A.   33
Chart 3. Inflation in boom-bust episodes, annual change in percent. 
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Note: Late 70s bust, 80s boom, early 90s bust and late 90s boom denote inflation for average other 
industrialised countries excluding Finland and Sweden. 
Data: See appendix A. 
 
Chart 4. Household debt in boom-bust episodes as a percentage of GDP. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
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Chart 5. Corporate debt in boom-bust episodes, as a percentage of GDP. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
 
 
Chart 6. Real long term interest rates in boom-bust episodes, per cent. 
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Note: The real rate of interest for Finland and Sweden refers to the real after-tax rate. Lack of data prevents a 
calculation of real after-tax rates the international average.  
Data: See appendix A. 
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Chart 7. Real effective exchange rate in boom-bust episodes, annual change in 
percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
 
Chart 8. Current account balance in boom-bust episodes, as a percentage of GDP. 
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Data: See appendix A.   36
Chart 9. Real economic growth in boom-bust episodes, annual change in percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
 
Chart 10. Output gaps in boom-bust episodes as a percentage of GDP. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
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Chart 11. Real private consumption in boom-bust episodes, annual change in 
percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
 
Chart 12. Real investment in boom-bust episodes, annual change in percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
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Chart 13. Export in boom-bust episodes, annual change in percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
 
Chart 14. Employment growth in boom-bust episodes, annual change in percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
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Chart 15. Productivity adjusted real labour costs in boom-bust episodes, annual 
change in percent. 
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Note: The productivity adjusted real labour costs have been defined as the difference between real 
compensation per employee growth and average productivity. 
Data: See appendix A. 
Chart 16. Government budget balance in boom-bust episodes as a percentage of 
GDP. 
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Data: See appendix A.   40
Chart 17. Government debt in boom-bust episodes as a percentage of GDP. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
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Appendix B: 
 
In this appendix we include five additional charts to illustrate boom-bust patterns. Chart 
B1 displays the behaviour of stock prices. As expected, stock prices rose rapidly during 
the boom phase. A peak in stock price growth around 50-60 % is registered for Finland 
and Sweden three years before the business cycle peak in 1989. The bust brought falling 
stock prices in both countries during three years. Subsequently a sharp rise followed.  
 
Unemployment in Chart B2 mirrors the behaviour of employment as shown in Chart 14. 
As the boom proceeds, unemployment falls steadily. In the two Nordic countries, the 
level is lower than the international average. The year after the peak, it shots up sharply, 
in particular in Finland, reaching a maximum around 16 %. The Finnish rate surpasses 
the international level two years into the bust. The Swedish rate reaches the international 
average after four years into the bust, and then it declines below. 
 
Average productivity growth in Chart B3 declines during the last years of the boom 
phase, becomes negative in Finland during the first years of the bust. Then it rises sharply 
in the two Nordic countries, reaching a growth rate far above the international average. 
Chart B2 illustrates the labour market shakeout created by the depression of the 1990s. 
The level of employment has not yet returned to its pre-crises level yet.   
 
Unit labour costs in Chart B4 peak one year after the peak of the business cycle. It then 
falls sharply, most sharply in Finland and Sweden. The depreciation of the markka and 
the krona and the wage moderation owing to the emergence of sizeable output gaps 
during the bust are the main reasons for this pattern. 
 
The boom in the two Nordic countries was associated with a higher growth rate of 
nominal government revenues (Chart B5) and in nominal government primary 
expenditures (Chart B6) than the international average. Likewise, the bust caused a more 
rapid deterioration. The picture in Chart B5 and in Chart B6 gives the same message as 
Chart 16 displaying government budget balances as a percentage of GDP and as Chart 17 
showing government debt as a percentage of GDP. 
 
To sum up, the Finnish and Swedish pattern displayed in Chart B1-B6 is more volatile 
than the international average; in particular the bust is associated with larger changes. 
This result is consistent with the conclusions we have reached from the data underlying 
Charts 1-17. 
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Chart B1. Stock prices in boom bust episodes, annual change in percent. 
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
Average other industrialised countries Sweden Finland
 
Data: See appendix A. 
 
Chart B2. The unemployment rate in boom bust episodes, percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
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Chart B3. Average productivity in boom bust episodes, annual change in percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
 
Chart B4. Unit labour costs in boom bust episodes, annual change in percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
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Chart B5. Nominal government revenue in boom bust episodes, annual change in 
percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
 
Chart B6. Nominal government primary expenditure in boom bust episodes, annual 
change in percent. 
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Data: See appendix A. 
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